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Abstract: Network-based monitoring and intrusion detection has grown into an essential component of enterprise 
security management. Monitoring potentially malicious activities across a set of networks classified at different 
security levels, however, presents subtle and complicated challenges. Analysis of intrusion alerts collected on an 
individual network only reveals malicious attempts to compromise that particular network, not the overall attack 
patterns across the enterprise. Development of a comprehensive perspective for intrusion analysis of all networks 
in a multilevel secure (MLS) environment requires care to ensure that the enforcement of information flow control 
policies is preserved. We describe an approach to cross-domain network-based intrusion detection. Leveraging 
the Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) high-assurance MLS federated computing framework, we 
developed an MLS policy-constrained network-based CD-IDS prototype using untrusted single-level components 
and multilevel (trusted) components, supported by open source software (i.e., BASE, snort, PostgreSQL and 
pgpool-II). Our prototype enables an analyst to view and manipulate network trace data collected from multiple 
networks, while enforcing mandatory access control policies to constrain the analyst to only those resources her 
session level dominates.  
 
Keywords: cross-domain services, multilevel security, intrusion detection, quality of security service 
1. Introduction 
Technological strategies for mitigating network threats have become essential for any Enterprise. In 
particular, the DoD mandates both a firewall and network intrusion detection system (IDS) be 
components of any enclave boundary defense strategy (DoD 2003). The Defense Security Service 
highlights this requirement for Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) enclaves, but the 
mandate applies equally to enclaves associated with any sensitivity level. Thus, the process of 
monitoring and analyzing network activity for anomalies or attack evidence is largely performed 
independently, for each network. 
 
To our knowledge, however, the literature has not yet explored the problem of monitoring malicious 
activity across a variety of networks of different sensitivities. A number of trends, including the growing 
number of interconnected sensitive and tactical networks, create the realistic prospect of 
simultaneous, correlated, distributed attacks against multiple networks of different sensitivities. Such 
attacks may be coordinated via legitimate channels created by cross-domain guards (Bailey 2007)—
e.g., a unidirectional security gateway, or data diode, passing messages from low networks to high 
networks—or via some covert or out-of-band channel. 
 
Regardless of the attack mechanism, analyzing and associating the attack evidence, given separate 
independent views of the “battlefield,” poses a technical challenge to effective network threat 
detection. As an alternative, we posit that a unified view of all network intrusion alerts may better 
assist the analyst in deriving an attack pattern and formulating an effective defense strategy. Where 
networks operate at different sensitivity levels, data like IP addresses, traces, and other attack 
evidence from a network should be treated as being at the sensitivity of that network. It follows that an 
analyst should be restricted to a multilevel view associated with her clearance, following the notion of 
multilevel views formalized by Denning, et al. (Denning 1988). From this, we derive the basic premise 
of a cross-domain intrusion detection system (CD-IDS): an intrusion analysis engine providing an 
appropriate multilevel view of attack data from networks of different classifications, leveraging the 
single-level intrusion monitoring devices already present in those networks. 
 
We note that, after an attack is detected, the problem of deploying countermeasures to an attack 
across networks of various sensitivities is similarly nontrivial. In particular, following the principle of 
non-interference, countermeasures deployed on low sensitivity networks must be agnostic to the 
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presence of attacks on higher-sensitivity networks. On the other hand, it is very sensible for 
preventative defenses to be deployed on networks of higher sensitivities, based on the presence of 
attacks in neighboring networks of lower sensitivity. 
 
The remaining sections describe the system architecture, the concept of operations, and the 
implementation of a CD-IDS prototype. The core components of the CD-IDS prototype are 
application-level services, running on a distributed MLS system. A user can invoke these services 
remotely (at the user’s session level) to access data from any network whose classification is 
dominated by the user’s session level. The paper concludes with a discussion of the challenges we 
encountered during development and of potential future work. 
2. System Architecture overview 
The Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) is a high-assurance, multilevel secure, distributed 
client-server system architecture which provides authenticated users secure access to data and 
services at different classification levels, using popular commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) applications 
running on stateless thin clients (Irvine 2009). We briefly describe the components and features of the 
current MYSEA system, as it serves as the platform for the CD-IDS prototype. 
2.1 Architecture overview 
MYSEA features a combination of (relatively few) specialized policy enforcing components and 
multiple open source and COTS components. 
 
The federation of high assurance MLS servers provides the locus of security policy enforcement, 
while the highly trustworthy Trusted Path Extension (TPE) and Trusted Communications Module 
(TCM) components authenticate/disambiguate users and single level networks, respectively. Each is 
a gate-keeper for user interaction with the MYSEA Server. Other system elements afford users the 
ability to run unmodified office productivity tools, web-based services, and DoD applications. 
Federated servers support scalability, which, when combined with single sign-on and virtualization, 
result in an extensible computing environment. The major components of the architecture are shown 
in Figure 1 and include:  
 High assurance MYSEA Servers, which together enforce the system-wide multilevel security 
policy and host various open source or commercial application services. 
 Client workstations executing popular software applications; and TPEs, which intercept network 
traffic between the client and the MYSEA Server, providing trustworthy network security, 
identification and authentication, and policy support. 
 Existing single level networks connected to the MYSEA Server via TCMs and link encryptors. 
TCMs complement link encryption by ensuring proper labeling of data passed back to the MYSEA 
Server.  
 Single level servers in the Multilevel Enclave area provide application services to both local clients 
and those in the legacy networks. Intrusion detection systems which monitor activity on single-
level networks are examples of these. 
2.2 Dynamic Security Services (DSS) 
Complex and adaptive networks may require demand-driven changes to the security provided. When 
conditions on the network change, requirements for security—e.g., restrictions as seen from the 
users' or attackers' point of view—may also change (Levin 2006). In MYSEA, the DSS Quality of 
Security Service (QoSS) mechanisms located on the TPE and at the MYSEA Server can modulate 
the protection services afforded to an ongoing user session, in response to a change notification. 
Protection mechanisms for client-server communications may be based upon network conditions such 
as INFOCON mode. This allows the quality of protection for the entire MLS LAN to be modified from a 
single point of administrative control within the high-assurance federation, dynamically, based on 
environmental conditions.  
2.3 MLS policy-constrained application services 
Policy-constrained applications may be invoked on the MYSEA Server from client workstations, as 
well as from other components on the server. Policy-constrained means that an application has been 
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modified to run in a multilevel environment without requiring extraordinary privileges, so it is both fully 
functional and constrained by the security policy (Irvine 1990). MYSEA currently supports a number of 
application protocols (HTTP, IMAP, etc) and provides many policy-constrained application services 
including web, email, wiki, webmail, WebDAV, HTTP streaming video, and VoIP services. 
 
Figure 1: Monterey Security Architecture 
2.4 Client usage scenario 
When a user logs in, the TPE passes the user’s identity credentials to the MYSEA Server, which 
validates the login attempt and instructs the TPE whether to allow or deny access to the network. In 
negotiating a session level, the TPE passes the user’s session level request to the Server for a 
decision. After a successful login and session level negotiation, the TPE allows the user to access the 
MLS LAN, the MYSEA Server and its services, as well as the single-level networks. 
 
At any time, the user can invoke the trusted path to request a session level change, log off, etc. The 
Trusted Path Extension blocks access to the network while the user's security attributes are in flux 
during such operations. To meet object reuse requirements (NCSC 1992), client state is purged at the 
end of each session, and data created or modified on the clients is stored on the MYSEA Server. 
3. Concept of operations 
We describe the concept of operations for a cross-domain intrusion detection system (CD-IDS) in the 
context of MYSEA. 
 
Using the TPE, a network security analyst logs in to MYSEA and begins a user session at a 
classification level within her clearance (e.g., a session at SECRET). The analyst uses her thin client's 
web browser to access the CD-IDS analysis application running on the MYSEA server. Via this web-
based interface, the analyst is able to review reports and data collected by the CD-IDS monitoring 
components deployed on any network associated with a level that is dominated by her session level 
(e.g., those alerts or data reported by the monitors on the UNCLASS and SECRET networks). 
 
In particular, the analyst is not able to access data or reports associated with a network above her 
session level (e.g., she cannot read alerts or data associated with a TOP SECRET network) nor is 
she able to access those networks not equal to her clearance (i.e., the analyst cannot access 
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The analyst may choose to save any report generated by the CD-IDS analysis application or to create 
new analysis artifacts based on the information obtained from the IDS reports. The analysts may 
share reports with the system’s security administrator or with other analysts, by leveraging existing 
MYSEA features. For example, she may save reports to her “home” directory on the MYSEA server 
via WebDAV access, or email the report to another user. In each situation, the report is written at the 
level of her current session (e.g., SECRET) and normal MAC information-flow policies are enforced. 
To terminate the session, the analyst logs out and her thin client is purged of all state.  
 
Responding to the alerts and analysis reports is handled through a different process and is outside 
the scope of CD-IDS. It is noted, however, that there are number of possible actions that may be 
taken by the system’s security administrator in response to a perceived attack, e.g. she may change 
the current network protection policy to a more restrictive one using DSS. This potential enhancement 
is further elaborated in Section 5. 
4. CD-IDS implementation 
Before discussing the design and implementation of the CD-IDS prototype, we describe the high-level 
requirements for the software components of the system. 
4.1 Software requirements 
The following requirements are derived from popular secure design principles, or inherited from the 
MYSEA project: 
 Minimize the introduction of new security-relevant or privileged components—in particular, 
software should defer to the authentication and single sign-on mechanisms provided by MYSEA. 
This requirement is motivated by the desire to minimize the size and complexity of the MYSEA 
Trusted Computing Base for evaluation purposes (CCMB 2006); 
 Software should not require any client-state be maintained—MYSEA clients purge state on user 
session termination; 
 Third-party source code must be available and its license must allow modification—MYSEA uses 
system call interposition with trusted proxies to enable unprivileged software to access the MLS 
LAN. This, currently, involves slight modification of the software to run on the MYSEA platform; 
 Software cost should be zero or very low—this follows the MYSEA goal to provide a system 
whose cost of ownership is low; 
 Interfaces should be intuitive and user friendly—this follows the MYSEA objective of providing a 
familiar, productive work environment, in which system behaviors are consistent with user 
expectations and in which the principles of ergonomic security are obeyed. 
4.2 Functional requirements 
The CD-IDS must meet the following functional requirements:  
 The CD-IDS shall make use of existing monitoring components (i.e., single-level IDS monitors); 
 The CD-IDS shall provide a mechanism for each single-level IDS monitor to store alerts and other 
data on the MYSEA Sever in a database that is classified at the level of the network to which the 
monitor is attached; 
 The CD-IDS shall allow users operating at different session levels to view alerts stored at or 
below their session level; 
 The CD-IDS shall deny any user request to modify the data collected by the single-level IDS 
monitors; 
 The CD-IDS shall provide a web-based user interface that can present a consolidated view of 
collected data and write data only at the user’s session level; 
 The CD-IDS shall keep a log of all user requests. 
4.3 Design considerations 
Following these requirements, an information flow design for the CD-IDS prototype in the context of 
MYSEA was developed.  
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In particular, Figure 2 illustrates the information flow between an IDS monitor on a single-level 
network, the single-level database in which the monitor stores its alerts, the IDS analysis engine that 
presents the MLS view of the collected data via a web-based interface, and the analyst's workstation. 
Each single-level database runs at the level of the network for which it provides service. For an 
analyst running at SECRET who requires read-access to the database service at UNCLASS, some 
component requires both (1) read-access to a subject at SECRET (the software running on behalf of 
the analyst) and (2) the ability to query (i.e., read-write access to) the database service available on 
the UNCLASS network; thus, it necessarily follows that this component must be trusted, and mediate 
this access appropriately. 
 
Figure 2: CD-IDS information flow 
Abstractly, Figure 2 is reminiscent of the Woods Hole architecture (NAS 1986) in which a trusted 
interface emulates a full MLS database using multiple, single-level databases. Indeed, this type of 
trusted, distributed database architecture could be used in this situation. Traditional Woods Hole, 
however, requires the trusted interface mediate all access to the data stores (to mediate write-
conflicts, handle poly-instantiation, etc); thus, for CD-IDS, we would require a variant of Woods Hole 
that provides trusted services on all network interfaces, i.e., mediating all requests to the set of single-
level databases including those from the analyst on the MLS LAN and those from the monitors on 
each single-level network. We, however, view a single, monolithic, trusted component with 
simultaneous read-write access to all networks to be highly undesirable. Thus, as an alternative, we 
have opted for a design using small, trusted database proxies, each of which mediates access to a 
single database. We elaborate on how this design decision was implemented for the CD-IDS 
prototype below. 
4.4 Prototype implementation 
The CD-IDS prototype consists of a policy-aware IDS analysis engine application running on MYSEA. 
Building on MYSEA's existing support for Apache and PHP, this application presents an MLS view of 
the alerts, logs and other data collected by the single-level IDS monitoring components on each 
classified network attached to MYSEA. The main components of the CD-IDS prototype are 
summarized below. 
4.4.1 Single-level IDS monitors 
These components reside on each single-level network attached to MYSEA. Each component collects 
traffic data and generates alerts for possible attacks on its respective network. The monitors send 
their alerts and logs to companion databases that reside on the MYSEA Server. The IDS monitors are 
not trusted to enforce MLS policy. 
 
In the CD-IDS prototype, the open source intrusion detection software Snort (Snort n.d.) implements 
this component.  
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4.4.2 Single-level DBMS 
A single-level database management system (DBMS) manages the databases used by the single-
level IDS monitoring components for a network. There are multiple instances of this component, one 
per security level. The DBMS is not trusted and runs at the security level of the network for which it is 
configured to provide database services. 
 
In the CD-IDS prototype, this component is implemented by the open source object-relational 
database system PostgreSQL 0). 
4.4.3 Intrusion analysis engine 
The intrusion analysis engine provides the user interface to access and analyze the alerts associated 
with each network. This component is not trusted and runs at the user’s session level. This application 
presents the analyst with a web-based interface to accessing this data.  
 
In the CD-IDS prototype, the open source Basic Analysis and Security Engine (BASE) (BASE n.d.) 
implements this component. BASE was selected because it is a popular analysis tool for Snort. BASE 
was slightly modified to support cross-domain analysis functionality, including the addition of logic to 
display an advisory classification level for the analyst and logic to query multiple databases. For the 
prototype, BASE is utilized by leveraging MYSEA’s existing support for PHP and Apache as policy-
constrained untrusted applications. 
4.4.4 Database Proxy Service (DBPS) 
The Database Proxy Service mediates access to the single-level DBMS. There are multiple DBPS 
instances, one per security level. The DBPS is trusted and has special privileges to read from and 
write to resources of different security levels. The DBPS primarily acts as a guard, by selectively 
dropping or proxying SQL commands to the DBMS. In particular, the DBPS enforces the following 
policy: 
 Proxy all requests, e.g. SELECT, UPDATE, DELETE, INSERT, if the security level of the 
requestor (i.e., the level of analyst's user session) is equal to the security level of the target (i.e., 
the security level of the destination DBMS); 
 Allow requests for the SELECT command if the security level of the requestor dominates the 
security level of the target; 
 Disallow all requests if the security level of the requestor does not dominate the security level of 
the target. 
In the CD-IDS prototype, the open source database middleware program pgpool-II (pgpool-II n.d.) 
was modified to implement this component. 
4.4.5 Secure Session Service (SSS) 
The Secure Session Service (SSS) is a MYSEA trusted process that mediates access to the MLS 
LAN. Thus, the SSS handles communication between BASE and the analyst's workstation, and 
between BASE and the DBPS (which is, itself, deployed as a service on the MLS LAN interface). The 
SSS is trusted and has the same essential privileges as the DBPS, though its responsibilities are 
different. 
 
The SSS exports a virtualized socket interface—resembling typical Unix system calls—to the 
untrusted subjects on the MYSEA Server. By using these interfaces, network requests are proxied to 
the SSS, which then performs the requests on the untrusted subject’s behalf. The SSS enforces 
policy by inspecting each of these network requests and determining whether to perform them or 
report failure; decisions are based on the client’s active session level, the levels of the source and 
destination for the network request, etc. 
 
Next, we describe how each of these components communicate and function together to implement 
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Figure 3 illustrates the processing flow and interactions among the CD-IDS components when an 
analyst, after starting a user session at the SECRET level, asks for IDS alerts stored in the SECRET 
and UNCLASS databases. 
 
Figure 3: CD-IDS prototype design 
1. The client's browser requests IDS alert data for the SECRET network via the web interface 
provided by BASE. 
 
2. BASE requests the SSS make a connection to the DBPS, since BASE lacks the privileges requires 
to establish a direct socket connection to communicate with either clients on the MLS LAN or the 
DBMS. 
 
3. The SSS establishes a connection to the DBPS associated with the DBMS at SECRET (but not the 
DBMS itself). The DBPS will forward all subsequent requests for SECRET network alerts to the 
DBMS at SECRET. Note that neither BASE nor the DBMS is aware that it is communicating with a 
proxy; for BASE, the DBPS acts as a server while, for the DBMS, the DBPS acts as a client. 
 
4. The DBPS establishes a connection to the DBMS at SECRET. For each query, the DBPS enforces 
the policy rules described earlier. In particular, as the security level of both the target and requestor is 
SECRET, the DBPS will forward all database queries. The result of each query is passed back to the 
client via the DBPS and SSS. 
 
5. The client's browser requests IDS alert data for the UNCLASS network. 
 
6. As in Step 3, the SSS establishes a connection to the DBPS associated with the DBMS at 
UNCLASS. 
 
7. The SSS forwards all requests for alert data on the UNCLASS network to the DBMS at UNCLASS 
via the UNCLASS DBPS. The DBPS establishes a connection to the DBMS at UNCLASS. 
 
8. Since the requestor's session level is SECRET and the security level of the target DBMS is 
UNCLASS, the DBPS forwards only specific, read-only requests, i.e. SELECT, to the DBMS at a 
lower classification level. The results of the query are passed back to the browser through via the 
DBPS and SSS. 
 
Figure 3 also shows a similar processing flow, indicated by dashed arrows. In this parallel case, 
another analyst at an UNCLASS session level uses the CD-IDS to view alerts associated with the 
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UNCLASS network, following the process outlined in Steps 1–4. Although not illustrated, attempts to 
access the SECRET DBMS are denied by the DBPS associated with the UNCLASS DBMS. 
5. Future work 
In this section, we describe some possible improvements to the CD-IDS prototype of particular 
interest to the project, including extending support for other COTS IDS products and developing a 
unified framework for network threat-response. 
5.1 Covert channel analysis 
The system's intrusion analysis engine application (BASE) always requests a connection to the 
single-level DBMS before issuing it a query. The DBPS forwards the connection request to the IDS 
database, as the current prototype DBPS only filters SQL commands. Thus, the presence or lack of 
presence of a connection perceived by a low subject (the DBMS) may be modulated by a subject at a 
higher level (the analysis engine application). This modulation may potentially be exploited as a covert 
channel. This channel can be closed if each proxy were to establish and maintain a persistent 
connection to its IDS database. This would effectively limit the possible communication channels from 
high to low that make use of the DBPS guard to those channels utilizing the SELECT requests—
which are, of course, necessary for proper operation of the system. 
5.2 Integrating automated threat response 
One possible enhancement to the CD-IDS prototype is to provide automated responses to perceived 
attacks, i.e. turning the CD-IDS prototype into a cross-domain intrusion prevention system (CD-IPS); 
initially for the MYSEA LAN and, in the future, for the single-level networks. The latter may employ 
common IPS technologies and techniques (DoC 2003) to reduce the impacts of the attacks to an 
acceptable level.  
 
An example for the MYSEA LAN scenario is as follows: In the presence of an attack on the UNCLASS 
network, the CD-IPS may change the active dynamic security services protection policy to one which 
prevents non-administrative MYSEA users from using network services during UNCLASS sessions 
(thus, preventing users from falling victim to attacks on that network). Such work would include 
developing a policy language appropriate for representing DSS network protection policies, 
developing flexible and customizable rules for when to invoke certain types of policies, and 
developing a scriptable interface or web interface for DSS administrative functions. 
 
Figure 4 depicts one possible design describing this capability. 
 
Figure 4: Notional CD-IPS design 
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After assessing the collected IDS data from BASE (not shown), the analyst creates and files intrusion 
analysis reports via WebDAV; the reports are kept in an “intrusion analysis data store” and tagged 
based on the criticality of the perceived threat. The DSS Administrative Tool (DSS-AT) monitors the 
data store and notifies the system’s security administrator when one or more high-criticality reports 
are submitted. Using the DSS-AT, the system administrator reviews the analysis reports and, if the 
threat conditions warrant a change of the active DSS policy, generates a more restrictive DSS policy. 
The administrator then instructs the DSS Manager, via the DSS-AT, to switch to the new DSS policy. 
The DSS Manager pushes the new DSS policy in the form of IPsec policy rules to individual TPEs; the 
IPsec policy rules are automatically generated by the DSS-AT. This approach provides the key 
functionalities associated with IPS technologies (DoC 2003). 
5.3 Support for other IDS monitors 
Suricata (Suricata n.d.) is an open source intrusion detection and prevention engine recently released 
by the Open Information Security Foundation. Some features that differentiate Suricata from Snort 
include full IPv6 support and multi-threading. Since Suricata writes its data to a spool in the 
unified/unified2 format, it should be possible to write its spool data (i.e., its alerts) to the same DBMS 
backend utilized by BASE, using barnyard/barnyard2 (Barnyard n.d.). Thus, integrating Suricata—or, 
in general, any legacy IDS using the unified/unified2 format—into the CD-IDS is possible. Exploring 
the extent of this support, however, requires further exploration. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we introduced the problem of monitoring and analyzing detected intrusion attempts 
across multiple single-level networks. We described our view of a cross-domain network-based 
intrusion detection system, in which a security analyst can obtain a coherent view of the intrusion 
alerts collected by the separate IDS monitors on all those single-level networks for which she has 
authorized access. We described an application-level approach for providing a CD-IDS that utilizes 
the COTS IDS monitors already present in single-level network enclaves, while leveraging various 
open-source products. We described the high-level requirements and design of our CD-IDS prototype, 
as well as its high-assurance MLS computing platform, viz., MYSEA. The implementation of the CD-
IDS prototype was described, with special attention to the interactions among the trusted and 
untrusted components of the system. The paper concluded with several improvement features, 
including the ability to dynamically alter network protection settings based on the perceived threat 
conditions. 
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